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Abstract 
This paper studies the responses of unemployment in Germany, the United States and Britain 
to the Great Recession of 2008-09 by making use of Beveridge curve analysis, and in the 
entire OECD with other techniques. It is shown that Britain suffered from recession but no 
structural problems; the United States suffered from structural unemployment during the 
recovery; Germany exhibited a much better performance both during and after the recession. 
The rise in OECD unemployment is broken down into parts due to aggregate activity, the 
construction sector and a residual attributed to policies and institutions, which is used to 
reach conclusions about policy. 
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The Great Recession of 2008 is the deepest that many countries of the OECD have 
experienced since the 1930s. In most countries it started sometime in 2007 or 2008; by the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 all countries were in some kind of recession. 
The worst affected sectors of the economy were construction and finance but from there it 
spread throughout the economy. Had this been a normal recession most economies would be 
seeing signs of recovery by 2009. But then a new “crisis” began, concentrated in Europe, and 
involving the debt levels of sovereign nations. This was a further negative and economy-wide 
shock that started in Greece and spread elsewhere, especially in the European South, largely 
because of high domestic debt levels and the fixed exchange rates within the Eurozone. As 
this is written at the end of 2012 the debt problems of the Eurozone are unresolved and the 
recession in the indebted countries is continuing. 
OECD labour markets responded in a variety of ways to the recession. Given the 
focus on construction and finance, and the labour content of the former, some differences due 
to the relative size of this sector in each economy would be expected. But there were other 
differences too, that could not be explained by the relative size of construction. My purpose 
in this paper is to take a close look at the differences in the response of unemployment across 
the OECD and make inferences about the functioning of different types of labour markets in 
recession. The ultimate objective is to reach conclusions that would be useful to policy-
makers in designing an optimal response to a negative shock. 
I will compare unemployment outcomes in 2009 and 2007. The earlier year was the 
last that labour markets operated under normal conditions, and we can take the 
unemployment level at that time to be close to a “natural rate”. By 2009 the recession had 
taken hold everywhere, and so the unemployment rise between the two years gives a fairly 
accurate picture of the impact of recession on unemployment. Following this comparison, I 
will briefly discuss the changes in unemployment up to 2012. I will argue that the countries 
that suffered most from sovereign debt experienced a deeper recession, if it is measured by 
the rise in unemployment. 
Section 1 describes the response of unemployment to the recession in OECD 
countries. Section 2 briefly outlines the theoretical framework behind the Beveridge curve, 
which is used to compare the experience of Britain, the United States and Germany in section 
3. Section 4 introduces a less structural approach and compares outcomes in all OECD 
countries, whereas section 5 discusses the impact of reforms associated with the debt crisis on 
the economies of Europe. 
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1.	The	impact	of	recession	on	unemployment,	2007‐2009	
 
Figure 1 shows the initial response of unemployment to the recession. Unemployment 
went up in all countries of the OECD except for Poland and Germany. Polish unemployment 
was declining rapidly up to 2007 and the decline continued for one more year, before rising 
again above the 2007 level. Germany is the exception in this recession and I will discuss its 
case in some detail. In the rest of the OECD unemployment went up, the rise ranging from a 
low point of 0.1 in the Netherlands to a high point of 9.7 percentage points in Spain. On 
average in the OECD unemployment went up by 2.7 points whereas in the Eurozone by 2 
points, as the worst of the Eurozone’s problems had not yet began. 
Men were affected worse by the recession than women were, with average increases 
of 2.7 and 1.2 respectively in the euro area (average figures for the OECD as a whole are not 
published). This, however, is common in recessions as the industries which have a higher 
concentration of men, the production industries, are more cyclical than service employment, 
where women are relatively more plentiful. The higher incidence among men would be 
particularly pronounced in this recession because of the plight of construction, which is male 
dominated. But the ones who have really borne the brunt of recession are the young workers. 
In normal times youth unemployment (ages 15-24) is on average twice as high as overall 
unemployment, although there are variations across countries, from 1.4 in Germany to 3.1 in 
Italy and 3.8 in Luxembourg. These ratios remained remarkably constant during the 
recession, being virtually the same in 2009. But of course the stability was in the ratios, not in 
the percentage unemployment rates. Youth unemployment increased on average by nearly 5 
percentage points, nearly twice the increase in the overall unemployment rate of 2.7 points. 
Germany is the exception again, experiencing a small fall in youth unemployment. 
The rise in unemployment was matched closely by the fall in employment across the 
OECD. This is shown in figure 2 for all 34 countries. The correlation between the rise in 
unemployment and the fall in employment is close, with a simple correlation coefficient of 
0.87. There are no obvious outliers, although Spain, Estonia and Chile experienced bigger 
rises in unemployment than justified by their fall in employment (and Iceland a smaller rise 
in unemployment given the fall in employment). I take the evidence in this chart as a reason 
to ignore changes in the labour force in the discussion of the impact of recession on 
unemployment and talk interchangeably between job loss and unemployment rise. 
When looking at disaggregated data most job losses would appear to be in industry. 
Industrial employment is more cyclical than service employment so often recessions are 
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blamed for destroying the “industrial base” of the economy. This, however, is either outright 
false or exaggerated. Cyclical recessions hit mainly industry but just as employment falls 
more in recessions, it rises more in recoveries. A second reason that the claim is misleading is 
that there are trend changes in employment across sectors associated with the structural 
transformation that should be taken into account when apportioning blame for job loss. 
Dealing only with the latter problem is revealing. Figure 3 shows the raw data on job loss 
across four sectors, all production industries except for construction, construction, all service 
sectors and agriculture. It is obvious from this figure that most job losses are in industry, with 
services actually contributing substantial net employment additions in Europe. Construction 
is a large contributor to job loss for such a small sector, because of the nature of this 
particular recession. 
Now extrapolating from the trends of sector employment rates over the period 2000-
2007, when OECD labour markets were going through a calm period, we find the 
unsurprising fact that industry and agriculture were losing jobs fast and services were gaining 
them. Construction employment exhibited no trend but the other sectors exhibited linear 
trends that fitted the data extremely well. I used the 2000-2007 trends to predict employment 
rates for each sector in 2009, and then deducted the actual employment rate from the 
predicted to find the deviation of actual employment from trend that can be blamed on the 
recession. The predicted job loss for the entire economy is very close to the actual loss but of 
course the two differ a lot in individual sectors, because of different trends. The result is 
shown in figure 4, drawn to the same scale as figure 3. 
In the European Union industry still emerges as the biggest job loss sector, although 
not to the extent that he raw data indicated. Services contributed a small number of jobs over 
and above the ones predicted by the structural transformation. Another interesting fact is that 
agriculture contributed to job creation: the exit from agriculture slowed down during the 
recession, a feature normally associated with developing countries. In the OECD as a whole 
the story is different. The biggest shortfall is in services, implying that as jobs were lost in 
industry and elsewhere because of the structural transformation, service sectors during the 
recession were not creating enough jobs to absorb the displaced workers. 
One final point to make about the response of unemployment to this recession 
concerns the relative unemployment experience of those employed at the onset of recession 
and those already unemployed. The stock of measured unemployment can increase either 
because more workers become unemployed and join the pool (known as an increase in 
incidence) or because those who are unemployed remain in the pool longer (known as an 
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increase in duration). The most common experience during recession is that in the beginning 
more workers join the pool. Those who are unemployed find it more difficult to exit to new 
job openings, but because the pool gets augmented by a number of workers with very short 
durations, the mean duration of unemployment falls. But as time passes the inflow drops and 
the durations lengthen because of limited job creation, so eventually the main part of the 
increase in unemployment is explained by higher durations. 
Figure 5 uses an approximation to distinguish between the contribution of new entry 
and longer durations to the rise in unemployment. On average and over periods as long as a 
year, the number of workers that flow into unemployment is about the same as the number of 
workers that flow out. Let E be the inflow and O the outflow, then approximately, E=O. I 
divide through by the number of unemployed workers, U and then use another approximation 
that gives the average duration of unemployment as the ratio U/O. This is intuitive in the 
sense that if out of a stock U, a number O leave each period, on average a person should 
expect to leave after U/O periods. Then I can write 
ா
௎ ൌ
ଵ
ௗ		       (1) 
Where d is the average duration of unemployment. I divide through again by the labour force 
and rearrange to get, ݑ ൌ ݁݀,	where u is the rate of unemployment and e is the rate of entry 
into unemployment. 
We have data for u for all countries of the OECD (used to derive figure 1) and data 
for d for several countries. I divide one by the other to get a series for e and then break up the 
log change in u between 2007 and 2009 into the sum of two terms, the log change in the 
constructed e and the log change in d. The result is shown in figure 5, with countries ranked 
according to the relative important of new entry in accounting for the changes in 
unemployment. 
The figure shows that the contribution of new entry is positive everywhere and 
important in the decomposition of unemployment changes. Its importance is due to some 
extent to the closeness of 2009 to the start of the recession. If I repeat the same exercise for 
2010 the relative importance of new entry decreases and that of duration increases. The 
severity of the recession is also important, with many workers losing their jobs in 2008 and 
2009. The mean duration of unemployment falls everywhere because of the inflow of so 
many workers, with the exception of the three North American countries, where it is higher. 
The big exception is the United States, where duration increases and the contribution of 
duration and new entry to the rise in unemployment are about the same. This is a new 
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experience for the United States, where new entry is usually a bigger contributor to the 
dynamics of unemployment than duration, at least at the onset of recessions, because of its 
lax employment protection system. 
Of course, the fact that mean duration falls does not imply that workers were leaving 
unemployment faster in 2009 than in 2007. Those already unemployed were experiencing 
longer durations because of the collapse of job vacancies but that increase was offset in the 
computation of the average by the very short durations of new entrants.  
2.	Theoretical	framework	
 
The theoretical framework that I use to explain the cross-country differences is based 
on the theory of search and matching. I describe it only briefly here because fuller 
descriptions can be found in easily-accessible texts elsewhere (Pissarides, 2000). The most 
relevant non-technical description for the purposes of this paper is in Pissarides (2011). 
The theory is based on the need to reallocate labour across employers because of 
changes in demand, worker preferences, technology and other factors that influence a firms’ 
profitability, and the slow speed at which workers are matched to new jobs. The slow speed is 
due to “matching frictions” that summarise a host of factors, such as differences across jobs 
and people and imperfect information about each other. Jobs become unprofitable and close 
down, creating a flow of workers into unemployment and job matching creates a flow out of 
unemployment. Their interaction implies that at any point in time there are vacant jobs and 
unemployed workers searching for each other. The number of workers that join 
unemployment depends on both aggregate conditions and on the intensity of structural 
change, whereas the speed at which workers leave unemployment depends partly on what 
they do during search and partly on how many job vacancies are available. 
A common criticism of this framework is that the matching frictions are irrelevant in 
recession. The reason that workers are unemployed is not that they have not located a job 
opening yet, but that there are no job openings (for a recent statement of this view see 
Michaillat, 2012). The framework that I will outline, however, can still be used to analyse 
situations characterised by a very low level of vacancies. The attractive feature of it is that it 
does not change as the economy moves from boom to bust, or from bust to boom: the same 
simple framework applies for the determination of unemployment in all situations.  
Unemployment is obtained from an equation that makes the flow into unemployment 
equal to the flow out of unemployment. Although this equality is a “flow-equilibrium” 
condition, we can use it as the equation that gives us actual unemployment at all times. 
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Empirically any differences between inflows and outflows are followed by fast adjustments 
to the rate of unemployment that bring the two back into equality. In this paper we will be 
focusing on the dynamics of unemployment over a two or three-year period and during 
periods of this length the dynamics are driven by changes in either inflows or outflows, not 
by beginning-of-period differences between the two. 
The flow into unemployment is the sum of new entry and the number of workers who 
separated from their jobs. In an analysis of youth unemployment the new entry is crucial in 
the determination of unemployment but if the objective is to study the response of overall 
unemployment to the recession it can be ignored without loss of generality. The reason is that 
new entry does not fluctuate much from year to year and is not a cause of changes in 
unemployment over the business cycle. The correlation between the changes in 
unemployment and the changes in employment shown in figure 2 provides further support for 
this claim. 
The flow out of unemployment is the sum of workers who have found jobs and those 
who exit the labour market. Exit is related somehow to recession, with more workers exiting 
in recession, at least temporarily (Shimer, 2012, Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2008). But again 
a simplification worth making in the study of the responses of unemployment to recession is 
that the flow out of unemployment consists only of workers who have found jobs. 
Suppose now during a short period of time the average probability with which each 
employed worker loses her job is s and the average probability that each unemployed worker 
finds a new job is p. Of course, there are large variations in these probabilities across 
workers, but at the macro level we work with averages, as if all workers were faced with the 
same probabilities. Then in a large market, the total number of workers that leave 
employment to enter unemployment during the period is ሺ1 െ ݑሻݏ, where u is the 
unemployment rate, and the total number of workers who leave unemployment to enter 
employment is	ݑ݌. Our claim that flows are large enough to bring the two into equality 
quickly implies that we can write the following equation for unemployment: 
ሺ1 െ ݑሻݏ ൌ ݑ݌.      (2) 
In recession more workers lose their jobs, so the average probability s is higher than 
in normal times. This is especially important at the onset of recession, when s increases 
temporarily. It returns to its normal level fairly quickly, before the end of recession. Such is 
the importance of s at the onset of recessions that some economists have argued that it is the 
driving force of the dynamics of unemployment (Fujita and Ramey, 2009). In our equation 
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unemployment increases with s because as more workers flow into the unemployment pool 
the stock rises to raise the number that flow out (at constant probability) to the higher inflow 
rate. 
But in recession the number of new job openings also drops and unemployed workers 
get matched to new jobs at slower rate. In our equation this corresponds to a fall in p, the 
probability of leaving unemployment. The fall in p is another reason for the rise in 
unemployment. Over time and before the end of recession s is restored to its normal value, as 
firms complete their labour shedding, but unemployment remains high because p remains low 
until the end of the recession. Over long periods of time and on average, changes in p are 
more important in explaining fluctuations in unemployment, especially in more recent 
periods (Fujita and Ramey 2009, Shimer, 2012, Petrongolo and Pissarides 2008). 
Two easily-derived elasticity expressions follow from (2). By total differentiation we 
obtain, 
ௗ௨
ௗ௦
௦
௨ ൌ െ
ௗ௨
ௗ௣
௣
௨ ൌ 1 െ ݑ.    (3) 
With 1 െ ݑ	approximately equal to 1, equation (3) says that a change in either probability 
approximately causes changes in unemployment in the same proportion – increasing when 
the probability of job loss increases and falling when the probability of finding a job rises. In 
recession both probabilities change, s rises and p falls. But my main interest in this paper is in 
the dynamics of unemployment after the start of recession, when the job loss probability 
recovers but the job finding probability remains low. 
The key relation in the search and matching theory of unemployment is the matching 
function. The matching function describes in a simple functional relation the speed at which 
the unemployed find jobs, out of the pool of job vacancies v. It is plausible to assume, and 
corroborated by a large number of empirical studies, that the number of productive jobs 
created in each period through matches is larger when there are more unemployed workers or 
more job vacancies looking for each other (see Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001, for a 
survey). From this result we get the intuitive prediction that the probability that an 
unemployed worker will leave unemployment during the period increases in the number of 
job vacancies for each unemployed worker, v/u. If recession is so deep that there are no 
vacancies at all, something that has never been observed, the probability of leaving 
unemployment is at its lowest, zero. 
The ratio v/u is known in the literature as the “tightness” of the market. If it is high it 
means that there are many vacancies for each unemployed worker, and so the market is tight, 
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or thick; there is a lot of recruitment activity. It contrasts with the situation where it is low, 
when the market is slack, or thin, and not much recruitment activity is taking place. The 
probability of leaving unemployment for the typical unemployed worker depends positively 
on the ratio v/u. With these assumptions our equation for unemployment, (2), becomes, 
ሺ1 െ ݑሻݏ ൌ ݑ݌ሺݒ/ݑሻ,  ݌ᇱሺݒ/ݑሻ ൐ 0.    (4) 
Equation (4) is a famous one in the economics of search and matching. We can derive 
from it a curve in a plane with vacancies on the vertical axis and unemployment on the 
horizontal that slopes down. It slopes down because in a market with more job vacancies 
there are more job matches and unemployment is lower. This curve is known as the 
Beveridge curve, named after William Beveridge who in 1944 in his famous book Full 
Employment in a Free Society described how vacancies in one industry can coexist with 
unemployment in another as workers take time to migrate between jobs. I show the 
Beveridge curve in figure 6. 
To a first approximation we can treat the economy as if it is always on the Beveridge 
curve. Small deviations from it do happen but they are not important in our analysis of 
unemployment in the Great Recession. We are mainly interested in unemployment changes 
over two or more years and for that length of time the changes in unemployment given by 
movements along the curve, or by shifts, are far more important than those given by small 
departures from the points on the curve. 
The point on the curve at which the economy will rest is an open question. This 
question occupied a lot of attention in the development of the theory, with some early 
investigators claiming that as an extension of the supply and demand condition of classical 
theory, equilibrium with frictions should be at the point where vacancies and unemployment 
are equal. But this is not necessary. There are two unknowns in figure 6, vacancies and 
unemployment, and one equation, (4), and the rest point will depend on a second equation 
that determines vacancies. The natural assumption to make about vacancies is that firms open 
new jobs to maximize their profits, so in general the location of the economy on the 
Beveridge curve will depend on the strength of demand for labour, given by the relation 
between labour productivity and the cost of labour that are appropriate to this environment. 
For our discussion, however, we do not need to know exactly where the resting point will be 
located. The reason is that we are interested in changes in unemployment; in how the labour 
market responded to the recession, and the exact location of the initial point is not important 
in this discussion. The important point to note is that if the demand for labour falls, the 
economy slides down the curve. 
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An economy that operates at high levels of demand and low levels of unemployment 
will be at a point on the Beveridge curve up and to the left. Denote one such point A and 
suppose that it is the location of the economy before the recession, say in 2007, the last year 
that “full employment” conditions prevailed. Now recession arrives and the number of 
vacancies falls, unemployment rises and we move down the curve, to some point B. 
Inspection of equation (4) will show that if s is now higher the curve will move out too, 
worsening the situation, but this movement is not important beyond the first few months of 
recession. We can simplify our diagrams by assuming that the curve is in a fixed position 
initially. Our interest is in developments in the 2-3 years after this initial rise in 
unemployment, when the economy has reached point B. 
After the initial rise in unemployment one of four things could happen. First, 
recession could continue with firms not increasing the number of vacancies and the economy 
remaining in the vicinity of B. We could say that an economy that exhibits this behaviour is 
one where lack of demand is stopping unemployment from falling, but it is not necessarily 
one suffering from inflexibility or structural deficiencies. A second response is for recession 
to continue as in the first case, but unemployment to continue to rise. In the diagram this is 
shown by a shift of the curve to the right, and a movement of the economy from B towards 
some other point C. In this case the economy has a labour market in which recession exposes 
some other weakness that is causing a further increase in unemployment despite steady (but 
low) demand. The movement out to C is evidence of a structural problem in this economy. 
Third, the economy could start a recovery with more new job openings and a movement back 
up the Beveridge curve. In this case the economy is recovering well and it eventually reaches 
its initial point A. But another possibility is that the economy starts a recovery with more job 
vacancies but unemployment is not falling as much as indicated by the Beveridge curve. In 
the diagram we then get a movement of point B upwards, almost vertically, or at best with a 
small bend to the North-East. This economy combines the recovery of the third case with the 
structural problems of the second. It moves up to some point like D. 
Of course, eventually recessions are reversed and economies return to their steady 
states. But this process could take long, and if a recession is mismanaged or if the country has 
poor institutions that create more problems during recession, the recovery phase could take 
long. Experience with the Great Depression of the 1930s and even the more recent long 
European recession of the 1980s shows that it is not unrealistic to expect to find such 
prolonged unemployment experiences. 
11 
 
3.	Country	experiences:	Making	use	of	the	Beveridge	Curve	
 
Unfortunately not many countries collect vacancy statistics on a comparable basis to 
unemployment, so it is not possible to apply the theoretical framework that we have outlined 
in all its detail. The United States and Great Britain are the only two countries that have a 
fairly long monthly time series of vacancies based on a survey that is comparable to the 
surveys that are used to compile unemployment data. Most countries, however, have a time 
series for registered vacancies, an administrative time series of a much smaller number of job 
vacancies that are reported to the government employment service. I will use this time series 
for Germany to show the contrast between the German and the US and UK labour markets, 
because of the importance of that country in the results of this paper. 
Because the British and US methods of data collection are comparable, I plot the 
Beveridge curves of the two countries on the same figure, shown as figure 7. The UK 
Beveridge curve exhibits fewer fluctuations and is closer to the axes, indicating that at given 
vacancy rate the unemployment rate is a little higher in the United States than in Britain. This 
should mean a somewhat lower natural rate of unemployment in Britain than in the United 
States, which is a reversal of the situation in the 1980s when British natural rate 
unemployment was considered to be much higher. The different span of the curves also 
indicates that the United States has experienced more business fluctuations since 2001 than 
Britain has, experiencing recession and recovery before the Great Recession hit in 2008, in 
contrast to Britain which was on steady state throughout the pre-2008 period. 
The impact of the Great Recession on unemployment and vacancies started in the 
very beginning of 2008 in both countries and by spring 2009 it was complete. In both cases 
the economy slides down a Beveridge curve, confirming that the rise in unemployment was 
due to the fall in aggregate activity (mimicking the movement from A to B in figure 6). Since 
then, however, an interesting contrast emerges. Whereas the British economy remained in the 
lower-level equilibrium until the end of our sample in July 2012, the United States economy 
created more jobs which were not taken up at the same rate as in the past. The UK economy 
is exhibiting macroeconomic rigidity, with no movement in the three and a half years 
following the rise in unemployment, but there is no evidence of microeconomic rigidity 
which could have led to higher unemployment at the very low vacancy rates, as happened in 
the 1980s. In contrast, the United States economy is exhibiting its usual macroeconomic 
flexibility, beginning to create new jobs soon after the bottom of the recession was reached. 
But unusually, the jobs were not being taken up at the same rate as in the past, implying an 
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unemployment rate that is close to two percentage points higher than its corresponding value 
when the economy was on the way down four years earlier. This is evidence of some new 
microeconomic rigidity in the United States labour market. 
The British case can easily be explained. The reforms to the institutional structure of 
the labour market in the 1980s and their consolidation in the 1990s and 2000s clearly had an 
effect. The reforms shifted the labour-market policy incentives to employment through tax 
reductions and tougher unemployment (and non-participation) support, and increased the 
institutional flexibility of the labour market. Important reforms took place in the role of trade 
unions and employment protection legislation. The decline of manufacturing and the breaking 
up of large public sector monopolies also contributed greatly to the decline of trade union 
power. 
Government policy after the Conservative and Liberal coalition took over in 2010 was 
aimed at reducing public sector spending and employment, in the hope that the private sector 
would create enough jobs to replace the jobs lost in the public sector. But this was not to be, 
partly because the public sector spending cuts had an impact on aggregate demand which 
checked the expansion of the private sector but also because of the debt crisis in the 
Eurozone, which reduced export demand. The result was a replacement of the lost public 
sector jobs by new private sector jobs but no job creation over and above this level, with the 
economy remaining at the initial depressed state. 
In the United States matters are different at both the micro and macro levels. At the 
macro level monetary and fiscal policies have been more expansionary. A new type of policy 
in recession is the “Quantitative Easing” programme of buying private assets with new 
money creation. Although these policies have not convincingly pulled the country out of 
recession, they must be key explanations of the differences in aggregate job creation between 
the US and Britain. At the micro level, however, the US labour market is showing less 
flexibility than it did coming out of past recessions. In the past the recovery of the economy 
followed a path very close to the original Beveridge curve, which indicated an economy 
without rigidities. But at the official end of the recession in June 2009 new vacancy entry in 
the US moved the economy up and away from the Beveridge curve, and this process 
continued until the end of the sample. We are observing macro flexibility combined with 
micro rigidity, in contrast to Britain, which is characterised by micro flexibility and macro 
rigidity. 
The reasons that the United States economy is characterised by micro rigidity, 
probably for the first time in its history, are not yet well understood. In the framework of the 
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search and matching model, when there is new vacancy entry not accompanied by a fall in 
unemployment it can mean only one thing: the matching efficiency of the labour market has 
deteriorated, at least temporarily. The reasons for it, however, can be many. They can be one 
of three types. Less willingness to accept job applicants by firms, less willingness to accept 
jobs by unemployed workers, or more mismatch, namely less good combination of 
characteristics of vacant jobs and workers (such as more diverse locations, more diverse 
industry distributions and others). 
All of the above have been mentioned in the literature as possible causes for the 
failure of unemployment to fall in the United States, in the face of economic recovery. Two 
stand out as more plausible and interesting in the context of our model. The first is the 
extension of unemployment compensation from a maximum of 26 weeks’ entitlement to 99 
weeks, introduced over a number of steps across the nation between 2008 and 2010. Such a 
policy change is expected to have two effects in the framework of the Beveridge curve. The 
first is an increase in reservation wages and less urgency to accept job offers because of less 
fear that compensation will run out before a better job comes along. Published estimates of 
this effect with a variety of samples over the last four decades have revealed small but 
significant effects. The second effect is an increase in the willingness to stay in the market to 
satisfy the criteria for collection of benefit, rather than drop out temporarily when benefit is 
exhausted. In the formal structure that we have used to derive the Beveridge curve we 
ignored this effect, but in reality one might expect some movement in and out the labour 
force. Entitlement to unemployment compensation should have an impact on the Beveridge 
curve by increasing the incentive to continue active job search. There is evidence that both 
effects have operated in the Great Recession, although probably not to the extent needed to 
explain the entire two-point displacement of the Beveridge curve (Rothstein, 2011). 
A second feature of the labour market in the Great Recession is the reduced mobility 
of labour. Labour mobility in the United States has been on a declining trend since 1980 and 
although it is still high when compared with European mobility, the difference between the 
United States and countries such as Britain is not significant anymore (Molloy, Smith and 
Wozniak, 2011). Traditionally, the United States labour market is considered to be a flexible 
one in which workers move quickly to take advantage of new job opportunities in the 
location that they arise. A fall in migration flows slows down the taking up of new job 
opportunities, giving rise to an outward shift of the Beveridge curve such as that shown in 
figure 7. 
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Recessions are periods when workers are less likely to move, but this cannot be the 
explanation for the fall in mobility or the outward shift of the curve, because jobs are being 
offered but not taken up. A more appealing explanation in the current recession is the housing 
market crash. Homeowners are traditionally less mobile than renters and it is plausible that 
the huge expansion of home ownership in recent years contributed to the falling mobility. 
Researchers have failed to find evidence that falling house prices and the negative equity in 
many houses are factors behind the fall in mobility (described in the literature by the term 
“house-lock” effect – see Molloy, Smith and Wozniak, 2011, and references therein). But 
composition effects due to the shift to more home ownership could still be significant. If this 
is the case, or if the secular decline in mobility, whatever the cause, is to persist, we should 
expect future recessions in the United States to be characterised by Beveridge curves of the 
kind shown in figure 7. In the past the US Beveridge curve was a much thinner line of points. 
Figure 8 shows the German Beveridge curve. As Germany has no vacancy survey, 
both the vacancies and unemployment series in figure 8 are based on administrative 
definitions reported by the OECD. However, the unemployment data are much more 
complete than the vacancy data, so the absolute number of vacancies shown and their ratio to 
unemployment is not an accurate measure of German labour market tightness. Tightness and 
the position of the curve should certainly not be compared with those of the US and British 
Beveridge curves in figure 7. But the shape of the curve and its shifts should be a good 
reflection of the underlying trends in German labour markets before and during the Great 
Recession. 
The dynamics of the German Beveridge curve are in complete contrast to the 
dynamics of the US and British Beveridge curves. There are two Beveridge curves, one lying 
further away from the origin for the years 2005-2007 and one lying closer to the origin for the 
years 2008-2012. The shift of the curve can be traced from early 2007 to October 2008. In 
terms of unemployment the economy is showing mild improvement through demand 
expansion in 2005-07, a sharp structural improvement in the transition period of 2007-08, a 
demand depression in the period 2008M10 to 2009M5 and a demand recovery from June 
2009 to the present time. The feature of the German labour market that stands out is the 
structural improvement beginning just before the recession, which helped the economy to 
deal more effectively with recession than the United States and Britain were able to do. 
The structural improvement in Germany followed a comprehensive reform 
programme that was implemented over four phases, between 1 January 2003 and 1 January 
2005. The programme is known as Hartz I-IV, or as the Schroeder reforms (the former after 
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the head of the Commission that recommended the package and the latter after the Chancellor 
who appointed the Commission and recommended the implementation). The incentive to 
introduce the programme, one of the biggest ever to be implemented over such a short period 
of time, was in response to the secular rise in German unemployment, to the loss of 
competitiveness and to a long recession and slow growth over 2000-05, that led many to call 
Germany the “sick man of Europe”. 
In 2003 the main reforms were designed to improve the flexibility of the labour 
market by relaxing employment protection and other restrictions on labour contracts. They 
also reduced labour costs, especially for low-wage jobs. In 2004 the main reforms were to the 
employment services and the efficiency of matching in the labour market. The most 
controversial part of the programme was introduced in 2005, when unemployment benefits to 
the long-term unemployed were drastically reduced, as were taxes on labour (Jacobi and 
Kluve, 2006). So overall, the reforms shifted the balance of public spending from social 
transfers to giving more incentives for work and made the labour market more flexible. 
Although the method of implementation was very different from Margaret Thatcher’s in 
1980s Britain, following a more cooperative approach with unions, many of the objectives 
behind the market reforms were similar in the two cases. But in Germany there was more 
emphasis on active labour market policy, such as training programmes and subsidies for 
employment and self-employment, especially for disadvantaged groups. 
In matching theory the reforms introduced in phases III and IV, in 2004 and 2005, 
lead to a leftward shift of the Beveridge curve. The 2004 reforms improve the efficiency of 
the matching services, so they produce more matches for given stock of unemployment and 
vacancies. The reduction in unemployment benefits in 2005 increase the search intensity of 
the unemployed, which also leads to more matches at given vacancies and unemployment. 
The phases I-II reforms, introduced in 2003, are directed at job creation, so they are more 
likely to increase vacancy entry at given Beveridge curve position; that is, they are more 
likely to move the economy up the curve. 
Figure 8 shows the path of the economy starting March 2005. Changes in the 
definition of unemployment at the beginning of 2005 make comparisons before and after 
March 2005 troublesome, although up to January 2005 there was no change and the economy 
was in a long recession. The recovery and movement up the Beveridge curve between March 
2005 and March 2007 are indeed consistent with the objectives of the 2003 reforms. But as 
the rest of Europe was also growing strongly at the time, it is difficult to entirely attribute this 
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recovery to the reforms; it is more likely that the reforms helped speed up the recovery 
process. 
But starting early in 2007, matching efficiency is improving in Germany and the 
Beveridge curve is moving inwards. Given the path of vacancies, which were not increasing, 
the reason for this shift cannot be demand-related or cost-related but has to have something to 
do with the matching process. The full reduction in unemployment due to this shift was about 
1.5 percentage points. Some authors have argued that the main reason for the shift is the 
reform to unemployment insurance that increased search intensity (Krebs and Scheffel, 2013) 
and others doubted that any programme had a big enough impact to shift it by this much 
(Akyol, Neugart and Pichler, 2013). But the alternative explanation offered by the last three 
authors, wage moderation, cannot be the only, or even main, reason behind both the 
movement along the curve and the two-year shift in the curve. It could be a reason for the 
movement up the curve, as lower wage costs increase vacancy entry, but not of the leftward 
shift in 2007-08.  
4.	Comparisons	with	other	OECD	countries	
 
In order to make comparisons between a larger set of countries I now revert to a more 
parsimonious framework that identifies the impact of policies and institutions on 
unemployment conditional on the fall in output. In particular, bearing in mind that the 
recession started in housing and financial markets and aggregate demand fell because of the 
subsequent fall in wealth and bank liquidity, we could ask the following question. Given the 
fall in output in a country, and the share of construction in employment, how well did the 
country manage to absorb the shocks without undue rise in unemployment? We can compute 
a residual rise in unemployment that cannot be explained by either the fall in output or the 
size of the construction sector and attribute it to factors like labour-market policy and 
institutions which affect unemployment. 
The comparison is done relative to the mean of the OECD, because we do not have 
precise models for individual countries. In order to compute the mean response of 
unemployment to the shocks I run a regression for 33 OECD countries with dependent 
variable the rise in unemployment from 2007 to 2009 and independent variables the rise in 
GDP in the same years and the share of construction in employment in 2007, to obtain: 
߂ݑ ൌ െ4.66 െ 0.19߂ log ܩܦܲ ൅ 0.75ܥܱܰ     (5) 
							ሺ1.24ሻ		ሺ0.064ሻ                (0.15)          ܴଶ ൌ 0.63   
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One straightforward interpretation of the estimated equation (5) is that the term for the 
change in GDP picks up the average impact on OECD unemployment from the aggregate 
shock, and the term in the employment share of construction (CON) picks up the impact of 
the sectoral shock. The remainder change in unemployment shows how well (or how badly) 
each country has managed to absorb the shocks when compared with the mean. 
Table 9 shows the residual change in unemployment obtained from equation (5). 
Referring first to the countries that we studied in the Beveridge curve analysis, we find 
consistent results. The United States experienced a residual rise in unemployment of nearly 
2.5 percentage points, which indicates a bigger burden of adjustment to the shock on 
unemployment than the average of the OECD. Britain is at the average and Germany well 
below, close to െ2 percentage points. 
Noteworthy among other countries that fared badly in their unemployment response is 
Spain, which experienced the biggest rise in residual unemployment of nearly 4 percentage 
points. This took place despite the large construction sector in that country, which accounted 
for 10 percentage points higher unemployment between 2007 and 2009. The only other 
country in which construction plays such a big role is Ireland, where the fall in construction 
activity also accounts for a 10 percentage point rise in unemployment. But in Ireland there is 
no further residual rise in unemployment, indicating that in that country the large rise in 
unemployment was due to the fall in aggregate demand and (especially) the size of the 
construction sector, whereas in Spain there is in addition a large rise due to the institutional 
structure of the labour market. 
Greece, Portugal and Italy are showing below-average increases in unemployment in 
2009. The reason is the excessive labour regulation in those countries and the high public 
spending, which kept unemployment artificially low in the first stages of recession. But these 
three countries, along with Spain and Ireland, are the countries that experienced the biggest 
rises in unemployment after 2009, when their excessive debt levels excluded them from 
international lending markets and they embarked on programmes of strict fiscal austerity. 
Changes in unemployment in other countries are closer to the average. In the two 
Asian members of the OECD unemployment went up by less than predicted by the fall in 
GDP, due to the labour hoarding characteristic of the large companies in those countries. 
Austria’s experience is close to Germany’s whereas Sweden and Denmark, perhaps 
surprisingly, experienced bigger rises in unemployment than predicted. The support given to 
the unemployed in those countries might be a reason for the absence of labour hoarding and 
the large rise in unemployment. 
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The country that is an outlier, even among the five highly indebted countries (Ireland, 
Greece, Portugal, Italy and Spain) is Spain. Although these countries experienced the biggest 
rises in unemployment after 2009, in Spain and Greece unemployment went up to 25% 
whereas in Ireland, Portugal and Italy it remained at 15% or below.  The rise in 
unemployment in Greece and the other countries, however, can be explained by the extent of 
the austerity measures required by the “troika” of the International Monetary Fund, European 
Commission and European Central Bank. In Spain unemployment went up my much more. 
The institution that contributed to the big rise in Spanish unemployment is the dual 
structure of labour contracts in that country. Following the introduction of democracy in the 
1970s, workers in regular employment were “protected” from business fluctuations with strict 
tenure policies and penalties on employers who terminated employment contracts. The result 
was excessive wage rises that could be demanded behind the safety net. But this caused big 
rises in unemployment in groups that were excluded, mainly young workers and women. 
Given the difficulty of reforming existing contracts, the Spanish government 
introduced in 1984 a second type of contract of limited duration, up to four years, with very 
little protection. There have been several reforms since then but the dual structure was 
preserved. With the majority of new jobs preferring to offer the fixed-term flexible contract, 
the Spanish labour market at the onset of the recession in 2008 was characterised by large 
numbers of both types of contracts. 
As shown by Bentolila et al. (2012) when the labour force is divided into two types of 
jobs, one protected by law and the other completely flexible, employment is more volatile 
over the cycle than if all workers had one type of contract. This is true even if the one type of 
contract is a flexible one. The reason is that in recession employers become overly cautious 
about giving permanent contracts to good employees on fixed-term contracts, fearing that 
they might be stuck with the employees if market conditions worsen. So they dismiss even 
good employees at the end of their term, instead of moving them on to regular contracts, 
whereas in a one-type fully flexible market they would not dismiss them. 
5.	The	impact	of	reforms	
 
Spain reformed its labour market starting 2010 (see Bentolila, Dolado and Jimeno, 
2012). So did the other countries that applied for loans from the European Financial Stability 
Facility (the predecessor of the European Stability Mechanism). Sweeping reforms were 
requested by the troika that examined the case for granting the loans, aimed at increasing 
market flexibility. In some cases reforms were introduced voluntarily to increase the 
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flexibility of the market. In Spain, the reforms that began in 2010 made the dismissal of 
employees for economic reasons easier and increased somewhat the costs of dismissing 
employees on fixed-term contracts. Firms were given tax incentives for short-time working 
following the success of this policy in Germany and the matching process was improved, also 
along the lines of reforms in Germany. Further reforms were introduced with the aim of 
making the market more flexible. These reforms should have positive effects on labour 
market performance, and yet, they seem to have had very little impact on unemployment so 
far. 
One reason for the absence of impact so far might be that the success of the reform 
process depends on cooperation with the unions, and unions were reluctant to cooperate, in 
contrast to Germany during the Hartz reforms. A second reason is related to the extent of the 
reform process. Although the reforms were in the right direction, they did not go far enough, 
in that the dual structure of the labour market has been preserved – although with less sharp 
contrast between the permanent and fixed-term contracts. But a third reason could be the 
more decisive one. 
Structural reforms that increase the flexibility of the labour market are beneficial for 
productivity, growth and eventually employment. But they take time to have an impact. In 
Britain in the 1980s the reforms undoubtedly helped productivity growth and employment, 
but unemployment did not respond for 5 to 6 years. Productivity responded before then as 
employers could now shed more labour but unemployment continued to increase because of 
the redundancies of unwanted employees. 
In Germany the reforms were introduced over the 2003-05 period in a more 
cooperative manner, which should have reduced the lags. Yet, it was not until at least two 
years later when their impact is detectible in the data. Similarly in Spain, Greece and Italy; 
the reforms were introduced at the same time as fiscal austerity, which made it very difficult 
for unions and the public to accept them and cooperate in a climate of wage reductions and 
spending cuts. Under these circumstances their implementation and effectiveness are reduced. 
Three years later there is no obvious impact of these reforms on labour market outcomes, in 
contrast to the fiscal austerity, which has had an immediate impact through aggregate demand 
and is causing high unemployment in all these countries. 
An obvious lesson from the experience with fiscal austerity and reforms is that it is 
difficult to get the timing right to avoid a deep recession. Fiscal austerity has an immediate 
negative impact on the economy because it operates through aggregate demand, which 
penetrates all sectors of the economy. Structural reforms eventually have a positive impact 
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but this positive impact comes in through supply-side changes that improve productivity and 
the incentives to hire labour. Supply-side changes always take longer to have an impact on 
aggregate economic activity, as they might involve things like the replacement of old 
equipment with new ones, the closure of some firms and the opening of others, and the 
shedding of labour in some establishments and the creation of jobs in others. In the short term 
there might even be a negative impact of the reforms as the first reaction of employers is 
likely to be to get rid of labour before they have enough confidence to start new job creation. 
Something like this has been discussed in the literature since at least Joseph Schumpeter’s 
“creative destruction,” which moves the economy to recession through the destruction of old 
unproductive capital giving the incentives to entrepreneurs to create new jobs to fill the gap. 
Another important factor in the success of structural reform is a favourable political 
environment. A favourable environment speeds up the implementation and reduces the lags 
because the social partners are more likely to cooperate with each other to bring about the 
intended results. When fiscal austerity is so deep and is introduced as fast as it was in the 
indebted countries of the European South, unemployment rises to such levels that conflict and 
opposition to the structural reforms becomes inevitable, putting at risk their effectiveness. 
Slower and more cooperative approaches to fiscal austerity have a better chance of creating 
the right political environment for structural reforms and bring about their success. 
6.	Conclusions	
 
The countries of the OECD went into recession in 2008 but their unemployment 
experiences differed substantially. An examination of three major economies, the United 
States, Britain and Germany, has shown that the introduction of structural reforms in Britain 
and Germany that increased the flexibility of the labour market avoided the structural 
problems of previous recessions. This contrasts with the United States, where the recovery of 
employment was slower in this recession than in previous ones, most likely because of 
temporary structural problems introduced by the extension of unemployment insurance to 
nearly two years and the secular decline in labour mobility. 
Extending the comparisons to the rest of the OECD reveals the contrast in the 
behaviour of unemployment between the indebted south of Europe and the other countries. 
Although some differences in the response of unemployment across countries can be 
explained by the dynamics of GDP and the size of the construction sector, a lot remains to be 
explained. We have argued that Spain in particular has poor institutions that raise 
unemployment above the levels that can be explained by construction and aggregate demand. 
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In the other indebted countries unemployment went up fast because the combination of fiscal 
austerity and structural reforms brings deep recession before the positive effects of structural 
reforms have time to have an impact on the economy. 
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